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The science which it is the purpose of this Association to
cultivate and advance first took shape and form in the brilliant
capital of the great people among whom we are met to-day.
An Englishman, long afterwards, gave it its name,' but Paris
was its birth-place, for there, in 1625, Grotius, hospitably re-
ceived by Louis XIII, whenflying from his own country as a
condemned criminal, dedicated to him and published to the
world his defure Belli ac Pacls.
Oxford had indeed, in the preceding generation, had among
her professors one who had written systematically on the law
of war, and there were countrymen of Gentilis, whose works
issued from the Italian press treated of the same subject, and
from a point of view not wholly different.2 We all know that
there are adumbrations preceding every new discovery, which,
it is afterwards seen, pointed to it in some uncertain or half
* Printed in the YALn LAW JOURNAL by permission of the Association in
advance of its appearance in its transactions.
I Jeremy Bentham, in 1789.
2 Holland, Studies in International Law, I, I.
2 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
certain way. The real discoverer nevertheless is he who gives
form and precision to what before was vague and ill-defined."
The foundations upon which Grotius built arefamiliar to us
all. Thejus gentium of the Romans he treated as largely the
expression of natural law,4 and natural law as the rightful
rule of conduct to govern the relations of associated bodies of
men, grouped into separate States, no less than those of their
individual members to each other.5 He was thus able to ap-
peal to an established system of jurisprudence, venerable from
its antiquity, ready at hand and at least approximately ade-
quate in principle, when studied in the light of divine revela-
tion, to regulate international intercourse under the conditions
of modern civilization. 6 The protection of natural law might,
indeed, as to certain points, be renounced, and thus a rule es-
tablished by thejus gentium totally inconsistent with the jus
naturale, as where by engaging in war one impliedly consents
to submit himself to the will of the conqueror, and so from a
freeman may become a slave. But, as a whole, what all men,
in allnations, have recognized as proper standards of human con-
duct, Grotius insisted had a natural claim to be accepted, sofar
as they might be applicable as a jus not merely inter homines,
but inter populos.
It was fortunate that the Civil law could supply a term so
elastic, and perhaps ambiguous, as that of jus gentium. The
most critical of modern scholars cannot deny that the Romans
often referred to it as a rule in matters of international obliga-
tion,'7 though it is no less certain that they viewed it as of
narrow application in this respect, and that it is the moderns
rather than the ancients that have given it a philosophical basis
in moral and religious principles of action." Nor, at its best,
as Grotius fully recognized, was it more than a scanty and
fragmentary collection. If the new system was to extend far,
s Grotius, de jure Belli ac Pacis, prolegomena, 30, 86, 38.
'dejureBelliacPacis, 1, 1, xiv; 11, 8, i, xxvi, 18, i, 20, xl.
5 Ibid., prolegomena, 17".
e Ibid., proleg., 53. Cf. The Maria, 1 Rob. Adm. Rep. 340.
7 Livy II, iv, XXI, x; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth., XXXV. The jus publicum
Romanum may fairly be said to rest largely on thejus gentium, as to the
rights of war, the obligation of treaties, title to the goods of a foreigner, the
juspostliminii, and the personal inviolability of ambassadors. See Dig. XLIX,
15, de Captivis et de Postliminio, 5, 11, 19; Postliminium estjus inter
nos ac liberos populos regesque, moribus, legibus, constitutum.
8 Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, I, 3.
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if it was to achieve great things, if it was to elevate the jus
humanum by its insistence on thejus divinum, if it was to give
certainty to speculative doctrine, sanction to public opinion, it
must draw from other sources, and appeal to better authority
than Greek philosophy or Roman precedent.
I venture to think that the service rendered in this direction
from time to time by the courts of justice has not always been
estimated at its full weight.
The way had been prepared by the natural and almost nec-
essary course of admiralty jurisdiction in civil causes. There is
one, and but one, part of the surface of the earth which belongs
equally to all men. The ocean can know no master but the
storm. The necessities of commerce have therefore driven the
civilized world to accept a law merchant framed for its protec-
tion by those most interested in its pursuit. The customs of
trade, whether it be trade by land or sea, soon become the rule
by which mercantile adventures are to be governed, if the sub-
ject of judicial inquiry.
Ocean navigation was in its infancy when Grotius wrote.
That the sea was open and free to all comers was by no means
universally admitted. A quarter of a century had hardly
elapsed since the invention of Davis' quadrant. The applica-
tion of logarithms to nautical calculations, and the introduc-
tion of middle latitude sailing were still more recent.
Voyages soon became longer; cargoes richer; maritime
casualties more frequent. Suits between merchants of different
nationalities began to crowd the courts. What law should be
applied? That of the actor, or of the reus; of the forum, or of
the world?
The courts of every country have ordinarily treated the
general maritime law, so far as it could be considered as settled,
and was not contrary to the expressed will of the sovereign by
whom they were commissioned, as being by usage a part of the
common or unwritten law to which they had a right to
resort.9 if the parties before them are all of nations acknowl-
edging a different (and the same) law on the point in question,
that law may be applied; but in any othercase they must take
the general maritime law recognized in the forum whose aid
has been invoked.1 0 Of this law, the Corpus Juris Civilis, so
9 The Lottawanna,21 Wallace's Reports, 558, 572; Liverpool Steam Co.
v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 United States Reports, 444.
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far as it went, was from the first universally considered an
authentic repository.1 1
But the court of admiralty as an instance court was also
called upon to punish offenses committed upon the sea, and,
when given the functions of a prize court, to pass upon the
broadest questions of public right. It was natural and almost
inevitable for each sovereign to instruct his judges that in these
matters also, unless specially directed to the contrary, they
were to proceed in a similar way, looking to the general law of
the sea, and to the rules of public law, affecting maritime
events, which might be commonly regarded as of international
obligation.1 2
In England, an unfortunate conflict of opinion between the
common law and the admiralty judges as to the limits of the
jurisdiction of their courts, retarded for a time the orderly de-
velopment of the principles of international law applicable to
maritime events. Criminal prosecutions even for offenses com-
mitted upon the high seas were anciently tried in the King's
Bench.' 8 For many centuries, however, they have been the
acknowledged subject of admiralty jurisdiction, and the great
judges who have succeeded to the functions of the admiral
have, by many important decisions, helped to solidify and sys-
tematize the public law of the sea.
Perhaps the most widely known of these judgments has
not met with the widest acceptance. In the case of the Fran-
conia, it was held that a sovereign may invest his courts with
the right to punish such acts as he may declare to be criminal
offenses, when committed on the high seas, if within the three-
mile limit, though by a foreigner against a foreigner and upon
a foreign ship.1 ' The legislative department of Great Britain,
in recognizing this doctrine, and providing for its enforcement,
10 The Scotland, 105 United States Reports, 24, 29; The Belgenland, 114
United States Reports, 355, 369.
11 See Clerke. Praxis Supremae Curiae Admiralitatis, 98.
12 The ancient form of the commission to the English Admiralty Judges to
act as a Prize Court, directed them to proceed "according to the course of the
Admiralty, and the law of nations." Douglas' Rep. *592, note. The same
language was adopted in the first ordinance passed upon this subject by the
United States. 7 Journals of Congress, 68 (1781). Cf. 6 ibid. 21 (1780).
Is Lord Hale's Treatise on Admiralty Jurisdiction, in the Hargrave Mss.,
quoted in Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Massachusetts Reports, 1, 12.
14, Regina v. Keyn, Law Reports, 2 Exchequer Division, 53.
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however, thought it necessary to forbid its application in any
case without the consent of one of the Secretaries of State.15
With this limitation it is safe to say that the claims ofjurisdic-
tion asserted in the Keyn case will not be pursued by criminal
proceedings against a foreigner, under circumstances which
could give a just cause of complaint to the country of his
allegiance. 16
It is the good fortune of the branch of jurisprudence which
it is our task to extend, that it grows in war no less than in
peace, perhaps we might say, more than in peace. The rule
that Inter arma silent leges has but slight applicationto courts
whose office it is to administer the law of nations respecting
captures on the sea.
The weighty words uttered a hundred years ago by Sir
William Scott in the case of the Maria have often been criti-
cised, but I believe they express a true conception of official
duty:
"I trust that it has not escaped my anxious recollection for
one moment, what it is that the duty of my station calls for
from me; namely, to consider myself as stationed here, not to
deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present pur-
poses of particular national interest, but to administer with
indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out,
without distinction, to indepeftdent States, some happening to
be neutral and some to be belligerent. The seat of judicial
authority is, indeed, locally here, in the belligerent country, ac-
cording to the known law and practice of nations: but the law
itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits
here to determine this question exactly as he would determine
the same question if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no preten-
sions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow
to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties
on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to
belong to Great Britain in the same character. If, therefore, I
mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider,
and which I mean should be considered, as the universal law
upon the question." 1
7
It has been said that the King of England sees in the two
15 Act of 40 and 41 Vict. Chap. 73.
14 See the rules as to the mer territoriale adopted by the Institute of Inter-
nationel Law in 1894.
11 The Maria, 1 C. Robinson's Reports, 340. The Oat See, 9 Moore, Privy
Council Cases, 141; Note in Cobbett's Cases on Int. Law 220.
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houses of parliament his equals ; in the law his superior. In-
ternational law, when administered in the lofty spirit of Lord
Stowell, may make a still bolder claim. It is superior not to
any king, but to any nation.
A nation may indeed disown and reject its rules, but only,
if this be done avowedly and persistently, at the cost of becom-
ing a sort of outlaw in civilized society.
It must be frankly owned, however, that the court which
seeks to declare and administer a universal law must some-
times make it for itself. It finds the authorities in conflict, and
it chooses between them. It looks to civilized society in its
largest sense for its guide; but simply because common accept-
ance and general usage are the main sources of authority for
rules of decision in admiralty and prize courts, their judges
have been, from the first, compelled often to take the part of
legislators, in settling the form of maritime law.
Nor was this true of those having admiralty jurisdiction
alone. In whatever court title was set up under a foreign de-
cree in rem, rendered in admiralty, it became necessary to ask
whether that decree was so framed and rendered as to work a
transfer, which by the comity of nations was entitled to re-
spect.
Was a ship sold as prize by order of the courts of aneutral,
or of a country into which she had not been brought, and
afterwards found in a port of a different power by her original
owner? He had a right to demand that the validity of her
condemnation should be re-examined in the new forum, so far
as to determine whether it had been obtained in accordance
with the laws of nations.1 8
So, on the other hand, if a ship captured in war were sold
by the captor without resort to a foreign court, she could be
reclaimed by her original owner before any of the ordinary tri-
bunals having cognizance of questions of title, because they
had the right to pronounce that under the laws of nations no
effectual transfer had been made.1 9
In constitutional monarchies the decision given in such a
case was governed by those laws, not because that rule might
have been prescribed by royal commission, but rather on the
18 Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch's Rep., 241.19 Assievedo v. Cambridge, 10 Modern Rep., 79; Lindo v. Rodney, Doug-
las' Rep., 591.
COURTS OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 7
ground that no other could have been. 20 The king could not
of himself create or vary the law of the land, nor the law of
the sea. That required the concurrence of the legislative power.
He could only choose those who were to administer the exist-
ing law. Hence, the judges were driven to assert that the law
of nations was part of the unwritten law of the land, and (to
justify this position) to rest it in great part on an unchanging
and unchangeable jus naturale, which in turn it was for them
to declare. 21
The same ground has been taken by the courts sitting un-
der republican governments. 22
In absolute monarchies the judges being the mouthpieces of
the sovereign, and their sentences subject to his overruling
power, their function was more restrained.
Indeed, in all countries where there is no constitutional pro-
vision to the contrary, an appeal has been given in prize cases
to the executive power, and their ultimate decision been treated
as largely a question of State policy.28 Such an appeal, how-
ever, cannot in fairness be decided upon any other rules than
those prescribed forthe court of first instance, which haverarely
been other than such as are to be found in the law of nations.
Whenever any other course has been taken, the voice of public
opinion sooner or later has condemned it, nor has it in its na-
ture the force of a strictly judicial precedent.
In England, the position that the law of nations is a part
of the municipal law was first, so far as is disclosed by the re-
ports of decided cases, asserted from the bench by Lord Talbot,
in 1736.24 He found no warrant for it in the earlier institu-
tional writers of his country, although many of them were
civilians. One of the most authoritative, St. Germain, the
author of "Doctor and Student," written early in the sixteenth
century, in enumerating its various kinds and sources, has
nothing to say of the law of nations, though the jus gentium,
in its Roman acceptation, is mentioned as inferior in authority
2o Key v. Pearse, Douglas' Rep., 584, 586; Letterof the Duke of Newcastle
to the Prussian legation, in 1753, given in Chitty, Law of Nations, appendix,
309.
21 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, IV, 67; 1,43;
Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burrow's Rep. 1480, 1481.
22 Henfield's Case, Wharton's State Trials, 52, 61, 62.
23 Azuni, Maritime Law of Europe II, Chap. IV, Art 4; Rapport de M.
Bulmerimicq: Commission des Prises Maritimes, Gand. 1880, 437, 44§.
24 See Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burrow's Rep. 1480.
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to the statutes of the realm. 25 Cowell, in his "Interpreter,"
published a century later, is equally silent, and even treats the
law merchant as "a privilege or special law differing from the
common law."2 6
In 170927 it is first referred to 28 in an Act of Parliament, as
(on certain points) of force in England. Four years afterwards,
however, when Sir Matthew Hale wrote his History of the
Common Law, he ignored its existence, and so did Wood in his
Institutes, published in 1722, which repeat the statements
made in "Doctor and Student." 29 Sir William Blackstone, in
his commentaries, which appeared some forty years later, 0 is
the first English text writer to assert that the law of nations
is part of the law of the land, and no doubt took this position
on account of observations made in a case31 in which he was
himself of counsel, by Lord Mansfield, a few months before his
work appeared from the press. Possibly, also, he was influ-
enced by the assertion of the Roman lawyers that the jus
gentium was part of the jus civile,3 2 for it is probable that
Blackstone attributed to thejus gentium much that more prop-
erly belonged to thejus feciale, and so gave it too wide an in-
ternational application. 3
The principle thus declared was received without question in
America, and remained unshaken by the Revolution. It was
fully applied, from the first, in the courts of the different
States,3" and in 1789 was put for the United States upon the
solid ground of constitutional recognition. It is one of the
powers expressly confided to Congress to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations.35 What these offenses are
it is left to that law to decide. The office of Congress is not to
declare, but simply to define and prescribe the sanction.3 6
2 5 Dialogue 1, Chapter IV, xi, xxi.
26 Tit. Law Merchant.
27 Holland. Studies in Intertlational Law, 193.
28 7 Anne, Chap. 12.
2s pp. 4, 10.
30 IV, 67. 1765.
31 Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burrow's Rep., 1480.
32 Cicero, de oficlis, H, Chap. xvii; Dig. 1, 1. de Jastitia et Jure. 5, 6, 9;
Gains, I, i.
83 See Maine's Ancient Law, Chapter IIL
2' Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dallas' Reports, 111, 114.
25 Art. I. See. 8.
86 United States v. Arjona, 120 United States Reports, 488.
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The courts of the United States and also those of Mexico
have a peculiarly wide jurisdiction over questions of interna-
tional law from the fact that treaties are in those countries
made by their Constitution part of the supreme law of the
land, and to be enforced as such by the judges of all courts,
State and national.3 7 This compels them to deal with many
controversies regarded elsewhere as cognizable solely by the ex-
ecutive power. Whoever in these countries may suffer in per-
son or property, by the infraction of a treaty, has precisely the
same right to appeal for redress to any proper court, as if his
suit rested upon an Act of Congress. It is obvious that this
throws the construction of treaties into the hands of the
courts.3 s
In a spirit of comity, they always seek to follow that, it
any, which may have been already adopted by the executive
and legislative departments,3 9 but not if it be manifestly con-
trary to what seems to them the true intent of the instru-
ment.
40
The meaning of a treaty almost always depends on the
sense in which it employs terms of usage in international law.
These terms therefore are constantly coming up for definition
before American judges, and so far as they do the work intelli-
gently, they add to the future precision of the vocabulary of
the science.
The treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
negotiated in 1899,41 opened with the declaration that during
the occupation of Cuba by the United States they would "as-
sume and discharge the obligations that may by international
law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of
life and property." What are these obligations? The Court
that applies the treaty must determine them; and it must do
so as a pure question of legal construction.
Diplomatists, in framing the engagements of nations, often
act hastily, at a distance from books of reference, and under an
overwhelming pressure of circumstances. It is fortunate that
their work is left to be interpreted in the deliberate course of
87 Constitution of the United States, Art. VI; Constitution of Mexico, Art.
126.
8 United States v. Rauscher, 119 United States Reports, 407, 419.
39 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters' Reports, 253, 308.
40 Castro v. DeUriarte, 16 Federal Reporter, 93.
4 . 0 United States Statutes at Large, 1755.
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judicial procedure. Nor even if the negotiation of a treaty ad-
mits of delay and careful thought, is it often that no occasion
of doubt as to its meaning can arise.
Is it not true that rules laid down in the most solemn declar-
ations and conventions are commonly expressed with less pre-
cision and certainty than those asserted by courts of justice?
It is, for instance, one of the maxims of the Declaration of
Paris, that "Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effect-
ive, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to
prevent access to the coast of the enemy." But has anypower
ever seriously contended that these words mean what they
literally declare? The question is not whether access is really
prevented, but whether it is made really dangerous. Hence it
has recently been adjudged that a single cruiser with modern
guns of long range may be sufficient to blockade a port, not-
withstanding the former practice of stationing a squadron of
two or more.4 2
Another maxim of this Declaration is that neutral goods
with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to cap-
ture under the enemy's flag. But what if they are in fact cap-
tured, and in the course of capture injured or destroyed? The
failure to provide for this event soon occasioned a suit in the
Prize Courts of this country, by the neutral owners of goods
seized on a German ship during the Franco-Prussian war, and
destroyed with the vessel as an act of war; the decision being
that restitution was only demandable as respects the goods
existing in specie, or their proceeds, if sold.43
The will of the late Duke of Brunswick called upon the
French courts, a few years since, to expound certain clauses in
the treaty of 1869 with Switzerland, which were found obscure.
Itwas provided in one articlethat in "contestations en mati~re
mobili~re et personelle" between subjects of the two powers
the rule of actor forum rei sequitur should prevail: in another,
that "en matire relle ou immobilitre," suits shouldbebrought
where the property lay. Was the term contestation personele
to be understood as meaning those only purely personal, or did
it cover suits to determine a succession to immovables, depend-
ing upon the validity of a will? Despite the exceptions of the
city of Geneva, as universal legatee, the jurisdiction of this
country, where the duke left large landed possessions, was main-
42 The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 United States Reports, 510.
43 Calvo, Le Droit Ift, §3033.
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tained; as justified both by the true construction of the treaty
itself, and by force of the statute law of France (Code of Civil
Procedure, Art. 59)."
The latter of these grounds brings into view one general
restraint upon the authority of the judge, which is of the first
importance, when he is called upon to pass upon treaty obliga-
tions.
Wherever a treaty is not a law, it is inferior to the law,
that is to the municipal law of the contracting powers.
It has sometimes been asserted that in those countries, such
for instance as France and Germany, in which treaties or
treaties of a certain kind must be ratified by the legislative
authority, such a ratification gives them the force of law. This
position seems to me hardly tenable. The legislature in such a
proceeding acts as a council of State, rather than as a repre-
sentative of the people or of other constituencies, and really
discharges an executive function.
Such I understand to be the view of the courts of this
country.4 5
A treaty, then, if it be no more than a contract, must yield
to any municipal law with which it is in conflict. It must be
disregarded or set aside by the authority to which it may be
confided to determine what the law is and to apply it in con-
troverted cases. Sir Robert Phillimore, as a Judge of an English
Admiralty Court, therefore did not hesitate to rule that no
British treaty could relieve foreigners from the operation of
laws which by the British Constitution were to affect all
alike. 46
Even in the United States and Mexico, it may be assumed
that a treaty contrary to the Constitution would be disregarded
by the courts, and it is certain that a statute passed after a
treaty would be superior to it.47
Nor are courts confined to a comparison of treaties with
the municipal law. They must often look, to find their true
" See the full statement and discussion of this case in the Revue critique de
LEgislation et dejurisprudence, XXIV, 82.
45 See the case of the La Construction, limited, cited and commented upon
in Barclay's Companies in France, 20, 85.
46 The Parlement Beige, Law Rep., 4 Probate Division 129,154 (Reversed,
but not on this point. S.C. 5 P. D. 197,204). Cf. Hall, Treatise on Interna-
tional Law. 199; Reg. v. Keyn, Law Reports, 2 Exchequer Division, 160.
47 See Professor Despaguet's paper in the Revue de Droit Int. Public, 1895,
II, 184.
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meaning, to the law of the word,-that law which the con-
tracting powers designed to affirm, to extend, or to restrict.
A wide view must be taken upon any question of construc-
tion arising upon a treaty between nations. Such papers must
be read in the light of the purposes they were designed to pro-
mote. They are commonly negotiated to provide for what the
general law of nations does notsufficiently secure. This general
law must therefore be inspected and ascertained, in order to de-
termine for what, outside of it, the contracting powers have
mutually stipulated.
Is it a question of extradition? The court may find it nec-
essary to inquire whether there could be extradition without a
treaty.4 8
Is it a question of alien ownership in real estate claimed un-
der a treaty which overrides some local statute? The conform-
ity of this statute to the law of nations must be examined.4 9
Is the treaty one of cession? What is ceded may depend
on what international law gave power to cede.5 0
Nor does the power of the American court stop here. It
considers an award of arbitrators appointed under a treaty as
carrying an obligation equal to that imposed by the treaty it-
self, and equally capable of legal enforcement by judicial pro-
cess. If the stipulation be that the award is to be accepted as
final, then the courts may uphold it as such, even if the execu-
tive department should object.5 1
It need not be observed what a strength this doctrine has
lent, in America, to the proceedings of the tribunal to be organ-
ized under the Conventions of The Hague. Should the United
States become a party to any controversy before it, its decision
will have for them and in their courts the force of an Act of
Congress and, so far as it settles private rights, suitors can in-
voke its aid under every sanction which law can supply.
Hubner, Sainte Croix, Galliani, and Azuni contended for a
single prize court for the world, to sit in some free city, with
judges drawn from every nation in Europe. Their ideal seems
ready to be crowned by even a broader realization, and for one
country at least a mode of enforcing judgment seems to exist.
I have thus far spoken more particularly of judicial declar-
48 United States v. Rauscher, 119 United States Reports, 407.
49 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 United States Reports 483, 484.
50 Mitchel v. United States, 9 Peters' Reports, 711, 733.
51 The La Ninfa, 75 Federal Reporter, 513.
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ation and enforcement of international law as affecting rights
of property. It has received hardly less important accessions
from the decisions of courts in cases involving questions of per-
sonal liberty.
Can one State refuse to permit citizens of another to take
up their residence within its limits, or after admitting them, can
it expel them against their will?
The extension of commercial intercourse in recent years, be-
tween the Eastern and Western nations, and the general
acknowledgment of the inherent right of voluntary expatri-
ation, have given new point to this inquiry. Publicists have
differed in their views as to the controlling principles of law:
governments have differed in theirs as to the policy which it
might be expedient to pursue. The courts have been appealed
to, in actions against executive officers for preventing a land-
ing; or upon writs of habeas corpus in favor of aliens held in
legal custody for purposes of deportation; and they have
affirmed the right of the legislative or political departments to
exclude whom they will, considering such action contrary to no
rule of international law, whether it may or may not be re-
garded as an infringement of international comity.52
And here let me say that the comity of nations differs, it
seems to me, fundamentally from the law of nations. It has
little value for the individual; none as an absolute test of indi-
vidual right. It is something as to which each nation, speak-
ing through its courts, is a law unto itself.r-
"What is termed the comity of nations,"it has been said by
one of the American courts of last resort, "is the formal expres-
sion and ultimate result of that mutual respect accorded
throughout the civilized world by the representatives of each
sovereign power to those of every other, in considering the
effects of their official acts. Its source is a sentiment of recipro-
cal regard, founded on identity of position and similarity of in-
stitutions." 5
I shall not detain you by remarking on what courts, in all
countries alike, have done towards shaping private interna-
tional law. That lies wholly in their peculiar field, and it is
52 Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, L. R. Appeal Cases, 1891, 272; Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 United States Reports, 698.
58 Qakey v. Bennett, 11 Howard's United States Reports, 33, 44; Security
Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 United States Reports, 624, 629, 635.
• " Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Connecticut Reports, 91,108.
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in their hands that it has gradually gained form and precision.
It is not to be regretted that there is less of unanimity and
certainty in judicial decision, in relation to public than in rela-
tion to private international law. The scheme ofjudicial inter-
vention would else be unworkable.
No government can conduct its foreign affairs with confi-
dence and dignity, if any important points are involved as to
which the executive and judiciary are not at one. Hence the
courts have been careful to keep themselves informed of such
transactions at the foreign office as may affect the subjects of
pending litigation, and in so doing they have made free use of
the doctrine ofjudicial notice.
The judicial tribunals of every country not only know
what all men know, but when the dealings of their government
with foreign nations are such as to give or withdraw a private
'right, may inquire for themselves what those dealings were, and
take their information, not in the shape of evidence fi-om the
parties, but from public documents and even special communi-
cations made particularly to them by the proper officer.65
Public law may thus be, in a measure, shaped by public policy.
But, in the long run, it will be by the public policy of no one
nation.
There is a serious objection to Judge-made law in general
which has much less of force when that law is of an interna-
tional description. Statutes are easily and often repealed. The
composition of the legislature changes frequently. The best
laws, it has been said, are those which abrogate some former
law, and remit things to their natural course and level. But
the court which, makes a precedent is apt to cling to it, and
courts have a certain permanence of corporate identity and ex-
istence. The precedent was established not as a rule of policy,
but of right. To decline to follow it is a confession of error.
Such a confession comes more readily when it is called for by
the public opinion, not of one country as to a question of do-
mestic concern, but of all countries as to a matter of concern
to the world at large. As soon as it is evident that any doc-
trinewhich has been judicially asserted as to a point of that
nature fails to receive a general consensus of approval, the
court which put it forward will seldom decline to qualify or re-
tract the position.
35 Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Simons' Reports, 213. 220; Jones v. United States,
137, United States Reports, 202, 216.
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An easy way is thus open for retracting any ill-considered
step.
The admiralty court in England, in the seventeenth century,
issued executions against the body on foreign judgments, at
the request of the foreign tribunal, and it was upheld by tie
courts of common law as warranted by that and by the law of
nations. Here not only was the determination of the foreign
court held conclusive, but a proper foundation for the immedi-
ate issue of domestic process.5 6 Such was not the opinion of the
world. The doctrine was weighed by publicists and found
wanting. The English courts soon saw that they had gonetoo
far, and in the next century the rule which they had thus sought
to import into private international law was quietly dropped,
by the same authority by which it had been introduced. 5 7
Incidents like these show, no doubt, that judgments of Prize
Courts may sometimes come from men not well informed as to
the principles with which they have been called on to deal, nor
can we forget that judicial tribunals can never be absolutely un-
influenced by the pressure of surrounding public sentiment. It
is true also that the judges of no country can be or perhaps
should be wholly free from a desire to support the policy of the
executive department.
To such causes, an application of the doctrine of "the con-
tinuous voyage" by the Courts of the United States, duringthe
Civil War,58 which has found favor in England, has been at-
tributed by a writer of authority.5 9 Perhaps, however, this
particular criticism is sufficiently answered by the similar rul-
ings which have been made by the Prize Courts of France and
Italy,6 0 and the declaration put forth'by the Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1896.
But there is a more serious element of weakness in Prize de-
cisions, which has detracted much from their force as compared
with those rendered by other tribunals upon subjects less inti-
mately connected with the incidents of war.61 It lies in the fact
5 6 Molloy dejure maritinzo et navali, 476.
5 7 Sinclair v. Fraser, 20 How. St. Tr., 468.
58 The Bermuda, 3 Wallace's Reports. 514.
59 Hall, International Law, 695, §247, and note.
s0 See the cases of the Vrow Houwina, and the Doelwijk, cited in Professor
T. S. Woolsey's paper on Neutral Rights and Contraband of War, in the Out-
look, LXIV, 167, and fully reported by Signor Fedozzi in the Revue de Droit
Int. XXIX, 55.61 See the remarks of Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations, II, 297.
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that their work is done mainly flagrante bello, and often in the
absence of the party most vitally concerned. This is the owner
of the libeled property, who not infrequently is an alien enemy.
If such be his national character, it has been the general prac-
tice of Prize Courts to refuse him a hearing.
6 2
An important step towards a change in this mode of pro-
cedure was made by the Supreme Court of the United States in
1870. They held that, under an Act of Congress providing for
the confiscation of property of those holding office under the
so-called Confederate States, by proceedings in rem conforming
as nearly as might be to those in admiralty, the owner, although
an enemy in arms, was entitled to appear, by attorney, and
make defense. That his title might be assailed in court, it was
said, necessarily implied that he might defend it there.
63
It must be owned that this decision paid no great deference
to English precedents in Prize cases, and relied on some in the
common law and equity courts which hardly support it."
Is there not, however, much to recommend its general accep-
tance? Such a step would be one in the same direction with
many that have been taken in recent times, in furtherance of
the humanities of civilization. The employment of counsel-of
those who are themselves officers of the court, charged with the
function of defending even the guiltiest offender against the
justice and sovereignty of the State-is a kind of intercourse
between subjects of belligerent powers which, if it has been
technically forbidden by a maxim of international law
framed with a different intent, can hardly imperil any true
national interest, and is demanded by a rule, not technical but
fundamental, Audi alteram partem.
The power of the courts to declare, and so, from time to
time, to expand, if not to reduce, the law of nations has rarely
been abused. To exercise it wisely and effectually requires a
learning, a knowledge of history, a familiarity with current
62 The Falcon, Robinson's Reports, 199 (1805); Halleck, International
Law, II, Chap. 32, §27; Wheaton, International Law, Dana's Ed., 4 8 0483,n.
as McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wallace's Reports, 259,267; United States
v. 1756 Shares, 5 Blatchford's Reports, 231, 237.
" Albretcht v. Sussmann, 2 Vesey and Beames' Reports, 326. An opinion
of Judge Story has sometimes been cited as deciding that an alien enemy can-
not sustain a claim in a prize court. His ruling was simply that as the onus
probandi in prize causes rests on the claimant, no title could be set up under a
contract of sale made pending the war with an enemy, and therefore void.
The Emulous, 1 Gallison's Reports (1813), 563, 571.
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events, a strength of reasoning, a freedom from local prepos-
sessions and partialities, which few attain. Hence, most Judges
in international law, have been content to repeat the language
of others. They have either followed the greatest of their pre-
decessors on the bench, or relied upon unofficial statements and
opinions of jurists of established reputation.
No method could have been better adapted to the orderly
and systematic development of this branch of law. It removed
any occasion for hasty legislation. It proceeded by analogy to
new applications of fundamental principles, but it proceeded
with a caution necessarily involved in taking steps in any one
country which, unless followed in others, must result in confus-
ion and error.65 It elevated the law of nations above the jus
civile, the law peculiar to any particular nation. It led English
Judges to assert that, at least in Prize cases, it was not to be
varied even by the omnipotence of Parliament, to the prejudice
of rights gained under it by the humblest subject of a foreign
power.6 1 It has frequently led to a construction of Executive
orders, affecting the subjects of other goverments, which nar-
rowed their field of operation and practically nullified them,
because it was assumed by the court that they could not have
been intended to violate what it held to beinternational obliga-
tions.
An instructive instance of this judicial enlargement of inter-
national law is furnished by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Early in the century, it had been declared from that bench,
by Chief Justice Marshall, that the modern usage of.nations,
as affecting the law of nations, constituted, of itself, no rule for
the guidance of courts. It could not act directly upon the
thing itself by its own force, but only as it might be adopted
by the sovereign power. As regarded the case in hand, the
sovereign power of the United States was to be regarded as
vested in Congress, and their course would be determined, and
properly, by questions of policy. The controversy before the
court was over enemy's goods seized and condemned without
any legislative authority. It was contended in behalf of the
government, -that the Executive had had it seized and appro-
priated rightfully under the laws of war, as established by
6 5 See The Fladoyen, 1 Rob. Adm. Rep., 135; The Maria, ib., 340.
66 Holland's Studies in International Law, 194; Heathfield v. Chilton, 4
Burrow's Rep., 2016.
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modern usage. The court dismissed the libel, because it could
"pursue only the law as it is written," and there was no
written law to authorize such confiscation.
The Chief Justice treated the ancient and original law of
nations as the ultimate source of authority. By that, he
declared, the mere existence of war did not authorize the
confiscation by judicial proceedings of enemy's goods found on
land, and modern usage could not, of itself, give the courts of
belligerent powers a wider authority.
67
It is to be observed in regard to the opinion thus delivered
that the course of reasoning was probably influenced by a tra-
ditional sense of the power of the American Congress over
foreign relations. It had such power under the original organ-
ization of the government of the United States, and exercised
it in adjudicating prize cases.68
During the present year, a somewhat similar question came
up in the same court.
In the war between the United States and Spain, a Spanish
fishing-smack, taken while making for a blockaded port, was
condemned as prize by a court of admiralty in Florida. By
the primitive usages of nations, such vessels were as liable to
capture and confiscation as any others which might fly an
enemy's flag. Sentiments of humanity produced what Merlin
described as a sort of tacit convention between all nations of
Europe for their exemption. 69 Lord Stowell, in the English
Court of Admiralty, in a case arising in 1798, regarded this as
"a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision." The Supreme
Court of the United States, on appeal in the case to which I
now allude, held that what might have been amatterof comity
at the close of the last century, had, by the close of this, ripened
into a settled rule of international law; that this was shown
by the works of modern publicists, which were to the courts
trustworthy evidence of what the law is; and that prize courts
were bound to take judicial notice of it, as a part of the law of
the United States, and give it full effect, in the absence of any
67 Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch's Rep., 110. See thejohanna Emilie,
29 English Law and Equity Rep., 562, in which Dr. Lushington, Judge of the
High Court of Admiralty, expressed a different opinion.
s Journals of Congress, V, 86-90; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dallas' Rep., 54,
82,85.
69 Ripertoire de jurisprudence. Pise Maritime, III, 1, 3.
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treaty or other public Act of their own government to the
contrary. 70
If judicial extensions of international law, made in such
ways as this, be compared with those which have been
attempted from time to time by the political departments of
government, I think it will be found that they have proved
more durable. They command public confidence more fully.
They have less the taint of selfishness; the color of occasion.
Attempts have often been made by neutral powers to
formulate and proclaim during a war, as maxims of interna-
tional law, such rules as would best promote the interests of
their own subjects. The Armed Neutrality of 1780 may be
taken as an imposing instance of this. The Russian declara-
tion of that year, limiting articles of contraband to munitions
of war and sulphur received the adhesion often powers within
the next two years.71 But was it ever seriously taken as
anything but a temporary expedient to subserve particular
ends under particular circumstances?
Nor can international law be said to have derived any even
and acknowledged growth from the awards of special arbitral
tribunals. Take that which is perhaps of first importance,
made under th6 Treaty of Washington of 1870. The principle
asserted by the majority of the arbitrators, that it is a viola-
tion of international duty for a neutral not to prevent her
subjects from fitting out and despatching to a belligerent port,
as a matter of mercantile profit, vessels suitable for men of
war, has certainly failed to command universal approval.
72
The growing solidarity of the world, bound together as it
is by ocean cables across every sea which outstrip the hours,
and now accepting in the main similar principles of social
government, demands more certaintyin the definitions of inter-
national obligations.
The doings of The Hague Conference are a response to this
sentiment, the more impressive, because that Conference was
called by a power that till in recent times seemed to have little
in her institutions that was common to the rest of Europe.
The proposition of such a Court as that which is to have its
seat at The Hague, would have seemed visionary, had not the
T0 The Paquete Habana, October Term, 1899, 175 Upited States Reports,
677.
71 Hall, International Law, 673, §238.
72 Cobbett's Cases on International Law, 258, 288.
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family of nations taken on a new character, as such, during the
nineteenth century. It had come to recognize certain stand-
ards of international morality. It had come, particularly, to
respect the force of judicial decision, pronounced by the tribun-
als of any one of this great family, but affecting the interests
of the subjects of another. It had come even to respect it, al-
though the interests affected might be those of a foreign power
itself.
In one conspicuous instance such a determination of sov-
ereign rights had been asked for by one nation at the hands of
another-that is of the courts of another.
I refer, of course, to what was done by Great Britain, a few
years since, in relation to the controversy between her and the
United States as to their territorial jurisdiction over Behring's
Sea. She contended that this extended only three miles from
the shore of Alaska. The President of the United States main-
tained that it ran to the middle of Behring's Straits and from
the meridian of 1720 to that of 193' West Longitude. Pending
a diplomatic controversy over this question between the two
powers, an American revenue cruiser seized a Canadian vessel en-
gaged in seal fishing nearly sixty miles from the Alaskan coast.
She was libeled by the United States in the Alaskan court of
admiralty, under the statute against fishing for seals in waters
subject to their jurisdiction, and a decree of condemnation was
passed.
Here was what might have been a casus bell]. The. seizure
was wrongful, if, as Great Britain asserted, the United States
had no jurisdiction beyond the three-mile line. But the spirit
of modern civilization makes for peace. It puts right above
might. It is more confident that a controversy will be justly
settled by a judicial trial, than by a military contest.
The Attorney General of Canada filed a "suggestion" in
the Supreme Court of the United States, that a writ of prohib-
itation should issue against the enforcement of the decree of
confiscation, stating that he did so "with the knowledge and
approval of the imperial goverment of Great Britain, and that
he would be represented by counsel employed by its minister
resident at Washington."7 3 This action was taken in aid of an
application couched in similar terms, which was presented by
the owner of the vessel. The Attorney-General and Solicitor-
General of the United States appeared in defence. The Court
78 In re Cooper, 138 United States Reports, 404, 412.
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issued a preliminary rule to shoW cause; but finally refused the
writ on the technical ground that the record did not showthat
the seizure was made outside of the three-mile line. It was ob-
served in the opinion7 ' that a prohibition could not issue upon
the request of the British government, unless the owner of the
vessel had made out a case of an infringement of his rights of
ownership, as the court had no jurisdiction to pass on ab-
stract political questions. Had, however, the real question of
boundary been presented on the record, and made the subject
of adjudication, it can not be doubted that both governments
would have acquiesced in the result: that of Great Britain
because it had invited the judgment, and that of the United
States because it had been pronounced by the highest judicial
authority in the land, acting under a Constitution which it
was its prerogative to interpret and apply.
This case is the more remarkable because no countries have
been more sedulous to maintain the immunity of foreign
sovereigns from suit than England and the United States. It
was early held hy the American courts to protect a foreign ship
of war from a libel founded on the jus postiiminii, however
irregular the proceeding under which it miglit have been taken
from the original owner.75 This was also, notwithstanding
the opinion of Bynkershoek to the contrary, soon afterwards
declared by the French courts to belong equally to anything
that might be due from domestic debtors, if attached by
proceedings in the nature of a foreign attachment.7 6 Recently
it has served to protect the Sultan ofJohore from an action in
England for a breach of promise of marriage, which the plaintiff
asserted that he had made to her while living incognito in that
country under the name of Albert Baker.7
7
On one allied point, the law cannot yet be said to be defi-
nitely settled. This is the limit of the right of defense when the
foreign sovereign is the actor. May not only an answer, but a
counter-claim be put in, and thus that same full justice be done
74 In re Cooper, 143 United States Rep., 472,503, 513.
75 The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch's Reports, 116.
78Journal du Palais, XIX, 22. S. P. De Haber v. Queen of Portugal. 20
L.J.N.S. Q. B. 488.
77 Mighill v. Sultan of Johore, Law Reports, 1 Q. B. Division, 149. Cf.
Calvo, Droit Int. §§1469, 1476; and the paper by Professor Audinet on the
case of the Succession to the Duke of Brunswick in the Revue de Droit Int.
Public, 1895, II, 385.
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to both parties to the controversy to attain which is the object
and rule of the ordinary action ?
It was said not many years ago by a distinguished jurist,
that "there is no place for the refinement of courts in the rough
jurisprudence of nations.17 9
For the refinements of form, of technicality, of procedure,
No. But for all those higher refinements, which in a large way
soften and ennoble the administration of human justice, there is
increasing room, and always must be. There can be no sub-
stantial difference between the manner in which a: court deals
with questions of international and of municipal law. Inter-
national law, in every civilized State, is municipal law. As
such, it has in each its sanction. The judgment that may be
rendered, would be no judgment, could it not be enforced as
between the parties to the litigation, or as against the res
which is the subject of controversy.
Between the executive authorities of treaty powers, their
engagements may rest simply on public faith. But so far as
their process runs, to the extent that courts administer the law
of nations it has its sanction, and every adjudication of this
nature tends to confirm a public sentiment by which it is
regarded as of binding authority between men and governments
alike.
No court indeed can extend its hand to compel a foreign
nation to obey its judgments; but its moral force in declaring
what is right and just-what is established by common consent
of mankind as the true rule of international conduct-this is
far weightier than anything attaching to the utterances of
kings or parliaments. A court is an arbiter before which con-
tending parties state their claims upon an equal footing,-
erected for this end, because all men agree that thus can justice
be best secured. What speaks for justice, speaks with a voice
which no nation, however powerful, can afford to disregard.
It is, as one of our associates has finely said, "PFexpression
souveraine du principe du bien, coordonn6 avec les exigences
de Putflit6 individuelle ou collective."8 0
The power which should go before an international tribunal,
and then decline to respect the decree which it had invoked,
Is South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge, etc., Law Re-
ports, 1897, 2 Chancery Division, 487; 1898, 1 Chancery Division, 190.
TO Hall, Treatise on International Law, 2d Ed. 810, n.
80 Corsi, de P Existence d' ane Sanction Positive dana k. Droit Interna-
tional, 28. Pisa, 1900.
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based upon the jurisprudence of the world, would forfeit the
good opinion of mankind. And hardly less endurable is now
the state of that nation, which has avowedly violated any rule
of international law which is generally held to have been estab-
lished by judicial decision. It goes against the moral sense of
Civilization. Its punishment is none the less severe, because it
is simply the natural, unwritten consequences of its acts.
Nations live long. They may suffer long. Men may escape
remorse for earth, at least, by suicide; after earth it may be by
pardon. But no divine mercy awaits the nation that has
proved itself unworthy, and its perpetuity of existence keeps it
forever at the bar of public opinion. History is the judge; and
it is the history of the world of which the greatestpower forms
so small a part. The record of conviction is not hastily made
up; but, once registered, it can never be effaced.
